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Abstract
Firms engaged in electronic commerce increasingly rely on machine learning algorithms to
drive a wide array of managerial decisions. The goal of this paper is to understand how compe-
tition between firms affects their strategic choice of such algorithms. We model the interaction
of two firms choosing learning algorithms as a game, and analyze its equilibria in terms of the
resolution of the bias-variance tradeoffs faced by the players. We show that competition can
lead to strange phenomena—for example, reducing the error incurred by a firm’s algorithm can
be harmful to that firm—and provide conditions under which such phenomena do not occur.
We also show that players prefer to incur error due to variance than due to bias. Much of
our analysis is theoretical, but we also show that our insights persist empirically in several
publicly-available data sets.
1 Introduction
Firms who engage in electronic commerce increasingly rely on predictive analytics to drive a wide
array of managerial decisions, ranging from recommendations to customer targeting and pricing.
Given some data, a firm facing a potential customer will use predictive models or learning algorithms
(henceforth algorithms) to anticipate the customer’s future behavior and preferences, allowing it to
better tailor its recommendation, targeting, and pricing decisions. In general, the success of such
a strategy will depend on the effectiveness of the algorithms used, with these algorithms having
advanced incredibly over the past couple of decades.
The point of departure for this paper is the observation that in many applications, firms utilizing
predictive analytics do so in a competitive environment, and so the efficacy of a firm’s analytics
depends not only on its own expertise and technology but also on that of its competitors. Broadly
speaking, this paper addresses the question of how the competitive nature of the interaction affects
a firm’s use of algorithms. For example, while a particular algorithm may be best for a monopolistic
firm targeting a customer, it may be suboptimal in a competitive environment. Furthermore, the
∗This work was initiated during the Special Quarter on Data Science and Online Markets held in the spring of
2017 at Northwestern University.
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optimal choice of algorithm in the competitive environment may depend on the competitors’ choices
of algorithms.
One useful way of analyzing algorithms is by examining the different sources of error they incur
via a bias-variance decomposition: splitting the error into bias and variance. In practice, there are
various ways of controlling the bias and variance of an algorithm: more complex algorithms, such as
deeper decision trees or regressions with more polynomial terms, have lower bias but higher variance;
regularization is often used to decrease variance at the expense of higher bias; and increasing the
amount of training data decreases variance.
Accurate algorithms minimize the sum1 of these terms—decreasing one term, holding others
fixed, is always beneficial, and there is no preference of bias over variance or vice versa as long as
the sum of the two is minimal. In this paper we aim to understand whether these observations also
hold in a competitive environment.
Our main results indicate that they do not. First, we show that in general lowering bias or
variance alone can be harmful. Second, we prove that, under some natural conditions, decreasing
bias is always beneficial. Finally, we consider a tradeoff between bias and variance and show that,
holding total error fixed, players strictly prefer to decrease bias at the cost of higher variance. One
practical implication of these results is that, in competitive environments, there is an added benefit
to more complex algorithms and added cost to regularization. In addition, there are scenarios in
which obtaining larger datasets may be a strategically harmful decision.
In this paper we model the interaction of two firms as a game, and analyze its equilibria.
Players’ actions are algorithms, and their utilities in expectation depend both on the accuracy of
their chosen algorithm’s prediction and on whether or not their prediction is better than that of
their opponent. In most of the paper we abstract away from the details of specific algorithms, and
instead model an algorithm as a distribution over predictions. Thus, players’ sets of actions in the
game are a class parameterized by a distribution, with elements ranging over biases and variances.
A canonical example is the set of normal distributions with different means and standard deviations.
For our first results, we show that there are classes of distributions and opponent’s choices
of distributions for which a player prefers to choose a distribution with higher bias (respectively,
higher variance), holding variance (respectively, bias) fixed. While the result on the benefit of higher
variance holds for general classes of distributions, the result on higher bias does not: we show that
if the class of distributions is “natural”—a class that includes normal and Laplace distributions—
then for any realization of the opponent’s choice, a player is better off with a lower-bias distribution
(holding the variance fixed).
Our main theoretical result is that if a player’s action set consists of normal distributions,
then this preference for lower bias holds even if the variance is not fixed. That is, for two normal
1The total error is the sum of these terms if the measure of accuracy is squared-loss, and otherwise it may be
some other combination of them.
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distributions with the same total error, the player prefers the one with lower bias (and higher
variance) regardless of the realization of the opponent’s choice. In other words, no-bias is an ex
post dominant strategy.
We supplement our theoretical results with numerical and empirical ones. First, we test the
robustness of our insight on the preference of bias over variance numerically with other families
of distributions, such as Laplace, and other utility functions. Our insight persists in many of the
variations, but not all – for example, they fail if players’ predictions are uniformly distributed.
Second, we consider our game but with specific algorithms on a specific dataset. Players utilize
a Ridge regression algorithm on a housing prices dataset2, controlling for the bias-variance tradeoff
using a regularization parameter. With only one player the optimal choice of regularization param-
eter may be large (indicating larger bias and lower variance), but with two players utilities increase
as the parameter is lowered (that is, for lower bias and higher variance).
Related literature The question of games between players playing learning algorithms can be
viewed as a special case of the dueling algorithms framework of Immorlica et al. (2011).
The analysis of learning algorithms in strategic environments is a newly burgeoning area of
study. Within this area, the papers most closely related to ours are Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz
(2017) and Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz (2018). Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz (2018), who build on
Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz (2017), consider a PAC learning with multiple learners with access to
the same dataset. They show that this game has a pure Nash equilibrium and that better-response
learning dynamics converge to it. One major difference between their work and ours is that in
their work players’ algorithms are fixed (more formally, in learning-theoretic terms, the hypothesis
classes are fixed), whereas in ours the emphasis is on the choice of learning algorithms (by analogy,
the choice of hypothesis classes). A second difference is that in their model all learners have access
to the same data, whereas in ours different learners have separate datasets.
Another related paper is that of Mansour et al. (2018). They also consider competition between
learners, but in an online setting in which the learners are bandit algorithms. They study the effect
of competition between the bandit algorithms on the exploration/exploitation tradeoff, and show
that the presence of competition may lead to the strategic choice of bandit algorithms that do not
explore as much as they would absent competition, and may thus be worse learners.
2 Model and Preliminaries
In general, a learning algorithm A takes as input data D = {(x1, f(x1)), . . . , (xm, f(xm))} and
a point x, and outputs a prediction fˆ(x) of f(x). In this paper we will abstract away from the
2Specifically, we use the California housing prices data from the 1990 Census, a dataset first utilized by Pace and
Barry (1997) and included in the Python Scikit-learn library.
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algorithm itself, and will only be concerned with its error in prediction f(x) − fˆ(x), viewed as a
distribution over R. The randomness in this distribution arises both from the choice of D and from
the inherent randomness in A.
This paper is concerned with players’ choice of algorithm. Thus, we will let players choose a
distribution from some class of distributions, as follows. Fix some random variable Z with mean
0 and standard deviation 1. A common choice for Z will be normal, a choice we motivate in
Section 4.1, but we can also consider uniform, triangle, Laplace, and other distributions. Players
might, for example, choose from distributions in the class
XZ =
{
σZ + µ : µ2 + σ2 ≥ 1} ,
the set of distributions whose bias squared plus variance (that is, its squared error) is at least 1.
2.1 One player
Now, suppose there is only one player, and suppose he chooses some distribution X. On realization
a, let the player’s utility be u(a) = 1 − a2: a benefit of 1 minus his squared loss. His expected
utility from X is thus u(X) = E[u(X)] = 1− E[X2]. Some standard observations:
Claim 2.1. If X = σZ + µ, then u(X) = 1− µ2 − σ2.
Proof. X is a random variable with variance σ2 and expected value µ. Since σ2 = Var[X] = E[X2]−
E[X]2 = E[X2]− µ2, it follows that E[X2] = σ2 + µ2. Thus, u(X) = 1− E[X2] = 1− µ2 − σ2.
This observation implies three corollaries. First, for fixed bias, the player prefers minimal
variance:
Corollary 2.2. For any µ, if σ < σ′, then the player prefers X = (σZ + µ) to X ′ = (σ′Z + µ).
Similarly, for fixed variance, the player prefers minimal bias:
Corollary 2.3. For any σ, if µ2 < ν2, then the player prefers X = (σZ + µ) to X ′ = (σZ + ν).
Finally:
Corollary 2.4. If X = σZ +µ, X ′ = τZ + ν, and µ2 +σ2 = ν2 + τ2, then the player is indifferent
between X and X ′.
Individual rationality One additional definition that will be useful is that of individual ratio-
nality. Intuitively, a distribution will be individually rational if a player derives non-negative utility
from choosing it. Formally:
Definition 2.1. A distribution X satisfies individual rationality (IR) if u(X) ≥ 0.
A simple observation that follows from Claim 2.1 is that X is IR if and only if X is such that
µ2 + σ2 ≤ 1.
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2.2 Two players
The bias-variance game is a two player game that might be appropriate for modeling the competition
between firms that use algorithms that, for example, personalize outcomes to customer preferences
and the firm with better personalization for a customer wins that customer and obtains value that
is related to the accuracy of the personalization.
Definition 2.2 (The Bias-variance Game). In the two player bias-variance game:
1. Both players i ∈ {1, 2} choose distribution Xi from Xi.
2. Both players i obtain samples ai ∼ Xi.
3. The player i∗ ∈ argmini ai wins (ties broken randomly) and has payoff 1−a2i∗; the other player
3− i∗ loses and has payoff 0.
We will primarily consider bias-variance games where X1 = X2 = X is a family of distribution
with error for X ∈ X normalized as µ2 + σ2 = 1.
Individual rationality Individual rationality of the one-player setting implies individual ratio-
nality of the two-player setting.
Proposition 2.5. Bias-variance games with distributions X ∈ X satisfying µ2 + σ2 ≤ 1 are
individually rational, i.e., expected payoffs in the game are non-negative.
Proof. In the one-player setting player i’s expected payoff with draw ai ∼ Xi is E
[
1− a2i
] ≥ 0 which
satisfies individual rationality. Consider the two player game where the other player j = 3− i has
draw aj . When the other player’s draw is |aj | ≤ 1, the payoff of player i is non-negative for all ai:
for |ai| ≤ |aj | ≤ 1 player i wins and has non-negative payoff 1 − a2i and for |ai| > |aj | then player
i loses and has payoff 0. When the other player’s draw is |aj | > 1, then player i’s distribution of
payoffs in the two player game dominates her distribution of payoffs in the one-player setting (when
player i loses, instead of a negative payoff her payoff is zero). As the latter setting had non-negative
expectation, so does the former.
Solution concepts We will utilize two solution concepts. For our numerical results we will
consider the utilities of players when their opponents’ strategies are fixed, and so look for a pure
Nash equilibrium. Such equilibria always exist in the games we consider, as the theorem below
states. For our main theoretical result on the preference of bias over variance we will show that
there exists a much stronger equilibrium, namely one in ex post dominant strategies.
Definition 2.3. A strategy profile (X1, X2) is a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) if for each player i
and strategy X ′i ∈ Xi it holds that ui(Xi, Xj) ≥ u(X ′i, Xj).
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Theorem 2.6. Fix a pair (Z1, Z2), and let X1 = {σZ1 + µ : (µ, σ) ∈ C1} and X2 = {σZ2 + µ :
(µ, σ) ∈ C2}, where C1 and C2 are compact, convex subsets of R2. Then the game has a PNE.
Definition 2.4. A strategy Xi ∈ Xi is ex post dominant for player i if for all X ′i ∈ Xi and all
realizations aj of player j it holds that ui(Xi, aj) ≥ ui(X ′i, aj).
3 Reducing Bias/Variance, All Else Fixed
In this section we show that reducing bias (resp., variance) holding variance (resp., bias) fixed can
be harmful. We begin with an example in which decreasing variance is harmful:
Example 3.1. Suppose player 2 plays the distribution N(0, ε), where ε is some small number, and
player 1 plays the distribution N(1/2, 1/2). Player 1’s strategy is monotone and satisfies IR, and
he obtains positive expected utility: Given that he wins, he is likely within ε of 0, and he wins with
positive probability. However, if player 1 decreases his variance to, say, 0, he will obtain utility
close to 0, since he will hardly ever win (for small enough ε).
Next, consider the following example, in which decreasing bias is harmful:
Example 3.2. Player 2 plays the uniform distribution on the interval [−1 − ε, 1 + ε]. For small
enough ε > 0 this satisfies IR. Player 1 plays the uniform distribution on the interval [−1, 1 + 2ε].
Again, for small enough ε > 0 this satisfies IR. Now consider a deviation by Player 1 to the interval
[−1− ε, 1 + ε], a deviation that reduces bias. This is harmful: Before the deviation, he never won
when his realization was in (1 + ε, 1 + 2ε]. After the deviation, however, the only difference is
the additional possibility of winning when his realization is in [−1− ε,−1). But such victories are
harmful, as they consist only of negative utilities.
Unlike Example 3.1, Example 3.2 is somewhat unnatural, in that the distributions used are
uniform. In Section 4.1 we argue that we should expect the distribution of the predictions of
learning algorithms to be normal. Is there an example in which reducing bias is harmful, but where
the class of distributions is more natural? The following two theorems state that there is not. The
first considers a class of distributions that are single-peaked, monotone, and with convex tails, and
the second considers normal distributions.
Theorem 3.1. Let Z be monotone and convex on [−∞, 0], and symmetric around 0. Let Xi =
σZ + µ be IR (and so satisfy µ2 + σ2 ≤ 1), and X ′i = σZ. Then ui(X ′i, c) ≥ ui(Xi, c) for any
realization c of player j.
Proof. The proof consists of several cases.
1) µ ≥ c: Since µ2 + σ2 ≤ 1, it must be the case that c ≤ 1. Thus, for any realization in which
player i gets non-zero utility, his utility is nonnegative under both Xi and X
′
i.
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Figure 1: Case 2 of Theorem 3.1.
Consider first the distribution X ′′i = σZ + c. Observe that, by monotonicity, for each point
x ∈ [−c, c], the pdf at x under X ′′i is higher than under Xi. Since all such realizations lead
to positive utility, u(X ′′i ) ≥ u(Xi).
Next, consider the comparison between X ′i and X
′′
i . On the interval [0, c] the distribution X
′
i
is an inversion of X ′′i with higher probability closer to the origin, and so on this sub-interval
X ′ leads to higher utility. On the interval [−c, 0] the pdf of X ′i dominates that of X ′′i , and so
also here X ′i leads to higher utility. Thus, u(X
′
i) ≥ u(X ′′i ), and so u(X ′i) ≥ u(Xi).
2a) µ < c ≤ 1: Consider Figure 1a, in which X ′ is the green pdf and X is the blue pdf. Area E
(from −1 to 1, and below both curves) leads to the same utility for both distributions. Area
A (under X ′) leads to higher utility than area B (under X). And finally, area D (under X ′)
leads to strictly positive utility. Thus, overall, u(X ′) ≥ u(X).
2b) c > 1: Consider Figure 1b, in which X ′ is the green pdf and X is the blue pdf. Area E (from
−c to c, and below both curves) leads to the same utility for both distributions. Area A
(under X ′) leads to higher utility than area B (under X). Area D (under X ′) leads to strictly
positive utility.
It remains to show that the losses under X ′ due to realizations in [−c,−1)∪ (1, c] are smaller
than the losses on the same intervals due to X. To this end, we will consider points x ∈ (1, c],
and show that the sum of the pdfs of X at x and −x is larger than the sum of the pdfs of
X ′ at those same points. Let g be the pdf of X ′. Then the sum of the pdfs of X ′ at points
x and −x is g(x) + g(−x) = 2g(x). The sum of the pdfs of X at the points x and and −x is
g(x+ µ) + g(x− µ). By convexity, g(x+ µ) + g(x− µ) ≥ 2g(x), completing the claim.
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Theorem 3.2. Let Z be normal. Let Xi = σZ + µ and satisfy µ + σ ≤ 1), and X ′i = σZ. Then
ui(X
′
i, c) ≥ ui(Xi, c) for any realization c of player j.
Proof. The proof is nearly identical to that of Theorem 3.1, except for case 2b: the upper tail of
the normal distribution is convex only from µ+σ onward. So this case must be handled differently.
However, to complete the proof, we actually only need that the pdf g of X ′ be convex from the
point 1−µ and higher. Since µ+ σ ≤ 1 it holds that 1−µ ≥ σ, and so g is convex on [c−µ, c+µ]
whenever c ≥ 1, completing the proof.
4 Tradeoff between Bias and Variance
In this section, we consider the tradeoff between bias and variance (i.e., µ2 + σ2 = 1) in two-player
competition. Notice that the requirement µ2 + σ2 = 1 ensures the IR constraint always binds in
one-player optimization setting, i.e., u(X) = 1−µ2−σ2 = 0 for all X. We fix the random variable Z
to be normal, and show that for arbitrary realization aj from the opponent player j, reducing bias
µi while increasing variance to σ
2
i = 1−µ2i is always beneficial for player i. Numerical calculations
at the end of this section, which consider distributions other than normal and variations on players’
utility functions, suggest that our insight for normal distribution is robust. First, however, we
motivate the use of normal distributions.
4.1 Motivation for Normal Distribution
Many commonly used econometric and machine learning procedures with tuning parameters de-
termining the bias-variance tradeoff have been demonstrated to produce predictions whose error
distributions are asymptotically normal, making the case for the normal distribution in our model.
One important example is the Ridge regression which produces prediction ŷ = ŵTx for the label
corresponding to the high-dimensional set of features x ∈ X ⊂ Rp via the vector of weights ŵ. The
estimator ŵ minimizes the regularized empirical risk function
R̂(w) =
1
2n
∑n
i=1
(yi − wTxi)2 + λ‖w‖22 (1)
from the set of examples {yi, xi}ni=1 with L2 penalty scaled by λ. The penalty constant λ is
responsible for the bias-variance tradeoff in the prediction. While increasing λ increases the bias
of prediction, it decreases the variance. Suppose that the true model generating the data is yi =
wT0 xi + ei where features xi are deterministic with maxk=1,...,p |x(k)i | < B and ei are independent
and identically distributed variables with mean zero E[|ei|2+δ] <∞ for some δ > 0.
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Note that we can express the minimizer of the empirical risk as
ŵ =
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
xix
T
i + λ I
)−1
1
n
n∑
i=1
yixi =
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
xix
T
i + λ I
)−1
1
n
n∑
i=1
(wT0 xi + ei)xi
= w0 −
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
xix
T
i + λ I
)−1
λw0 +
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
xix
T
i + λ I
)−1
1
n
n∑
i=1
xiei
Note that since ei are mean zero random variables, then
E[ŵ] = w0 − λ
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
xix
T
i + λ I
)−1
w0.
Therefore for prediction ŷ = ŵTx, we can express asymptotic bias as
bias(λ) = λ
(
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
xix
T
i + λ I
)−1
wT0 x
By the Central Limit Theorem
1√
n
n∑
i=1
xiei
d−→ N
(
0, σ2 lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
xix
T
i
)
,
where σ2 = E[e2i ]. Thus √
n(ŷ − wT0 x− bias(λ)) d−→ N(0, V (λ)),
where
V (λ) = σ2xT
(
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
xix
T
i + λ I
)−1
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
xix
T
i
(
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
xix
T
i + λ I
)−1
x.
Note that bias(λ) is monotone increasing in λ. At the same time V (λ) is monotone decreasing in λ.
The normal random variable with mean bias(λ) and variance V (λ)/n approximates the distribution
of the prediction error ŷ − wT0 x.
4.2 Preference for Lower Bias in Normal Distribution
Theorem 3.2 shows that reducing bias in normal distributions is beneficial if the variance is fixed.
Here we give a “stronger” result: that as long as the total error is fixed, reducing bias (which
increases variance) in normal distribution is also beneficial under normal distributions.
Theorem 4.1. Let Z be normal. Let Xi = σZ+µ and X
′
i = τZ+ ν, where µ
2 +σ2 = ν2 + τ2 = 1.
If ν2 ≤ µ2 then ui(X ′i, a) ≥ ui(Xi, a) for any realization a of player j.
Corollary 4.2. Let Z be normal. The strategy Z is ex post dominant within the strategy class
X = {σZ + µ|µ2 + σ2 = 1}.
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Proof of Theorem 4.1. We compute the expected utility of player i with random variable X =
σZ+µ against the realization a of player j. Without loss of generality, we assume a ≥ 0 and µ ≥ 0.
E[u(X, a)] =E
[
(1−X2) · 1{|X| < a}] = Pr[|X| < a]−E[X2 · 1{|X| < a}]
Evaluate
Pr[|X| < a] =
∫ a
−a
1√
2piσ2
exp
(−(x− µ)2
2σ2
)
dx
=Φ
(
a− µ
σ
)
− Φ
(−a− µ
σ
)
where Φ(·) is the CDF of Z, i.e., the standard normal distribution.
E
[
X2 · 1{|X| < a}] =∫ a
−a
x2
1√
2piσ2
exp
(−(x− µ)2
2σ2
)
dx
=− µσ√
2pi
(
exp
(−(a− µ)2
2σ2
)
− exp
(−(a+ µ)2
2σ2
))
− aσ√
2pi
(
exp
(−(a− µ)2
2σ2
)
+ exp
(−(a+ µ)2
2σ2
))
+ (σ2 + µ2)
(
Φ
(
a− µ
σ
)
− Φ
(−a− µ
σ
))
Due to constraint that µ2 + σ2 = 1,
E[u(X, a)] =
µ
√
1− µ2√
2pi
(
exp
(−(a− µ)2
2− 2µ2
)
− exp
(−(a+ µ)2
2− 2µ2
))
+
a
√
1− µ2√
2pi
(
exp
(−(a− µ)2
2− 2µ2
)
+ exp
(−(a+ µ)2
2− 2µ2
))
Take the derivative of E[u(X, a)] respect to µ,
∂E[u(X, a)]
∂µ
=
[√
1− µ2 − (a+ µ) µ√
1− µ2
+
(a2 − µ2)(1− aµ)
√
1− µ2
(1− µ2)2
]
exp
(
−1
2
(a− µ)2
1− µ2
)
−
[√
1− µ2 + (a− µ) µ√
1− µ2
+
(a2 − µ2)(1 + aµ)
√
1− µ2
(1− µ2)2
]
exp
(
−1
2
(a+ µ)2
1− µ2
)
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(a) Normal Distribution (b) Laplace Distribution
Figure 2: Ex post utility curves of player i against different realization aj from opponent player j.
To prove Theorem 4.1, it is sufficient to show this derivative is non-negative for all µ ∈ [0, 1] and
a ≥ 0, and it can be simplified as
[(2µ2 − a2 − 1)(1− aµ) + 2µ2(1− µ2)] exp
(
aµ
1− µ2
)
−[(2µ2 − a2 − 1)(1 + aµ) + 2µ2(1− µ2)] exp
( −aµ
1− µ2
)
≥ 0
(2)
The remaining proof for inequality (2) is quite tedious with heavy calculation, and so is deferred
to Appendix A as Lemma A.1.
4.3 Numerical Results for Other Distributions and Payoffs
In this subsection, we want to illustrate the robustness of Theorem 4.1. Specifically, in the proof
of Theorem 4.1, there are two assumptions which enable a clean closed form for ex post utility,
and thus, simplify our argument: (a) the shape (i.e., density function) of normal distribution; (b)
the utility function ui(a1, a2) = (1 − a2i ) · 1{ai < aj} with assumption µ2 + σ2 = 1 which makes
the term with CDF Φ(·) cancel out. We mathematically write the closed form of the utility on
variants of distributions and utility function, and use MATLAB to numerically evaluate its value.
The following numerical calculation results suggest that our result holds generally in many cases
beyond our theoretical assumptions (a), (b).
Other Distributions We numerically calculate the ex post utility curves (against arbitrary re-
alization from the opponent player) and expected utility curves (against arbitrary strategies of the
opponent) on various distributions. As shown in Theorem 4.1, with normal distribution, the ex post
utility curve is always non-increasing for all opponents’ realizations. Based on numerically evalu-
ations with Laplace distribution, its ex post utility curve is also non-increasing for all opponents’
11
(a) Logistic Distribution (b) Uniform Distribution
Figure 3: Expected utility curves of player i against different strategy µj from opponent player j.
realizations. See Figure 2, where we plot the ex post utility curves ui(µi, aj) holding realization
aj fixed for normal distribution, and Laplace distribution. The x-axis of each figure is player i’s
µi, and the y-axis is the ex post utility ui(
√
1− µ2iZ + µi, aj). Another interesting observation
through this numerical result is that with normal distributions, the ex post utility is almost flat
for µi ≤ 0.5, i.e., while µi = 0 is a dominant strategy, picking any µi ∈ [0, 0.5] is a “pretty good”
strategy.
For logistic distribution, the ex post utility curve is no longer non-increasing; however, the
expected utility curve is non-increasing against arbitrary strategies of the opponent, i.e., picking
the no-bias distribution Xi = Z is the unique pure Nash equilibrium.
For uniform distributions, monotonicity does not hold on either the ex post utility curve or the
expected utility curve (and there is a symmetric pure Nash equilibrium with non-trivial bias). See
Figure 3 for logistic distributions and uniform distributions.
Other Utility Functions Here we consider the utility function ui(ai, aj) = (R−a2i ) ·1{ai < aj}
for arbitrary reward R > 0 with normal distribution Z. For general reward R 6= 1, (i.e., either
the IR constraint does not bind or it is violated), the monotonicity of ex post utility does not
hold. However, the expected utility curve is still non-increasing against arbitrary strategies of the
opponent, and no-bias remains a dominant strategy. See Figure 4.
5 Empirical Results
In this section we test our insight on the preference of variance over bias on a widely-used dataset.
In particular, we utilize the California housing prices data from the 1990 Census, a dataset first
12
(a) ui(ai, aj) = (0.5− a2i ) · 1{ai < aj} (b) ui(ai, aj) = (5− a2i ) · 1{ai < aj}
Figure 4: Expected utility curves of player i against different strategy µj from opponent player j
with normal distribution.
utilized by Pace and Barry (1997) and included in the Python Scikit-learn library. It includes
20,640 observation on 9 characteristics, such as number of rooms, median income, etc.
We analyze a game between two players, each of whom gets roughly half the data, and uses a
Ridge regression in order to predict median housing prices. Running a Ridge regression involves
setting a regularization parameter λ, where λ = 0 is the standard OLS regression, and increasing λ
leads to a model with greater bias but lower variance. Thus, we will let the players play the game
for various values of λ. (See the discussion in Section 4.1, specifically equation (1).)
More specifically, we do the following:
1. Use 10% of the data for testing.
2. From the remaining 90%, each player draws a random half.
3. Each player learns 100 Ridge regressions, with λi ranging from 0 to 1000 in intervals of 10
for each player i.
4. For each (λ1, λ2), players play the game on the 10% test data, summing the utilities.
Repeating the procedure above 100 times and summing the utilities leads to the utilities depicted
in the respective payoff matrices of Figures 5a and 5b. In these figures player 1 is the row player
and player 2 is the column player, and the (i, j)’th entry corresponds to the row player choosing
λ1 = 10i and the column player choosing λ2 = 10j. In Figure 5a, for example, player 1’s utilities
are higher as the choice of λ1 is lower, corresponding to a choice of lower bias and higher variance.
The same can be seen in Figure 5b, where player 2’s utility is higher as he lowers λ2.
Observe also that the benefit of lower bias/higher variance is higher when the opponent plays
a higher bias/lower variance strategy.
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(a) Player 1 payoff matrix (b) Player 2 payoff matrix
Figure 5: Player utilities under Ridge regression. Player 1 and Player 2’s utilities are depicted for
entries (λ1/10, λ2/10). For example, in (a) player 1’s utility is optimized in the upper-right corner
when λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 1000.
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Appendix
A Omitted Proof in Theorem 4.1
In this section, we show that the derivative of the ex post utility with respect to µ against any
realization a of the opponent is non-positive for all all µ ∈ [0, 1] and a ≥ 0.
Lemma A.1. The inequality (2) holds for all µ ∈ [0, 1] and a ≥ 0.
Notice that there are two regimes: (a) the player always gains non-negative payoff, i.e., a ∈ [0, 1];
(b) the player sometimes suffers negative payoff, i.e., a > 1. Therefore, we break Lemma A.1 into
these two regimes and show them separately.
Lemma A.2. The inequality (2) holds for all µ ∈ [0, 1] and a ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Starting from inequality (2) copied here:
[(2µ2 − a2 − 1)(1− aµ) + 2µ2(1− µ2)] exp
(
aµ
1− µ2
)
≥[(2µ2 − a2 − 1)(1 + aµ) + 2µ2(1− µ2)] exp
( −aµ
1− µ2
)
Consider the following two cases.
Case 1: (2µ2 − a2 − 1) > 0; multiply both sides by exp
(
1
1−µ2
)
1
2µ2−a2−1 ,
(2)⇔
[
(1− aµ) + (2µ
2(1− µ2))
(2µ2 − a2 − 1)
]
exp
(
1 + aµ
1− µ2
)
≥
[
(1 + aµ) +
(2µ2(1− µ2))
(2µ2 − a2 − 1)
]
exp
(
1− aµ
1− µ2
)
⇐
(and now it is obvious that we can drop the term (2µ2−a2−1), because we have (2µ2−a2−1) ≤ 1
from µ2 ≤ 1) so the factor is “gainy”)
[
(1− aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] exp(1 + aµ
1− µ2
)
≥ [(1 + aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] exp(1− aµ
1− µ2
)
⇔
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(replace exponential functions with Taylor Series)
[
(1− aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [ ∞∑
k=0
((1 + aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
]
≥ [(1 + aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [ ∞∑
k=0
((1− aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
]
⇔
(pull out first two terms of the Series)
[
(1− aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [1 + 1 + aµ
1− µ2 +
∞∑
k=2
((1 + aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
]
≥ [(1 + aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [1 + 1− aµ
1− µ2 +
∞∑
k=2
((1− aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
]
⇐
(separate it into two inequalities and if both are true then the combined inequality is true)
Condition 1a:
[
(1− aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] · [1 + 1 + aµ
1− µ2
]
≥ [(1 + aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] · [1 + 1− aµ
1− µ2
]
⇔
(multiply through by (1− µ2))
[
(1− aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] · [1− µ2 + 1 + aµ]
≥ [(1 + aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] · [1− µ2 + 1− aµ]
⇔
(split out the terms in the first bracket and cancel (1− aµ)(1 + aµ))
(1− aµ) (1− µ2)+ (2µ2(1− µ2)) [1− µ2 + 1 + aµ]
≥ (1 + aµ) (1− µ2)+ (2µ2(1− µ2)) [1− µ2 + 1− aµ]
⇔
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(further cancel additive constants from both sides)
(−aµ) (1− µ2)+ (2µ2(1− µ2)) [+aµ]
≥ (+aµ) (1− µ2)+ (2µ2(1− µ2)) [−aµ]
⇔
(divide out aµ(1− µ2))
− 1 + 2µ2 ≥ +1− 2µ2
⇔
2(2µ2 − 1) ≥ 0 X which is finally true, directly from the assumption of Case 1.
and Condition 1b:
[
(1− aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [ ∞∑
k=2
((1 + aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
]
≥ [(1 + aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [ ∞∑
k=2
((1− aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
]
⇐
(drop the gainy (2µ2(1− µ2)) terms, by the left-hand side sum terms dominating for every k)
[(1− aµ)]
[ ∞∑
k=2
((1 + aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
]
≥ [(1 + aµ)]
[ ∞∑
k=2
((1− aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
]
⇔
(cancel a factor of (1− aµ)(1 + aµ))[ ∞∑
k=2
(1 + aµ)k−1
(1− µ2)k · k!
]
≥
[ ∞∑
k=2
(1− aµ)k−1
(1− µ2)k · k!
]
X which is true for every k.
Case 2: (2µ2 − a2 − 1) ≤ 0.
Case 2a: aµ ≥ 1; drop the term (2µ2(1− µ2)) from both sides in inequality (2)
(2)⇐ [(2µ2(1− µ2))(1− aµ)] exp(1 + aµ
1− µ2
)
≥ [(2µ2(1− µ2))(1 + aµ)] exp(1− aµ
1− µ2
)
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which holds immediately because under assumptions of Case 2a, the LHS is non-negative and the
RHS is non-positive.
Case 2b: aµ < 1; working from inequality (2)
(2)⇔
(replace exponential functions with Taylor Series)
[
(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1− aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [ ∞∑
k=0
((aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
]
≥ [(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1 + aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [ ∞∑
k=0
((−aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
]
⇔
(pull out first two terms of the Series)
[
(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1− aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [1 + aµ
1− µ2 +
∞∑
k=2
((aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
]
≥ [(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1 + aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [1− aµ
1− µ2 +
∞∑
k=2
((−aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
]
⇐
(separate it into two inequalities and if both are true then the combined inequality is true)
Condition 2b1:
[
(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1− aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [1 + aµ
1− µ2
]
≥ [(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1 + aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [1− aµ
1− µ2
]
⇔
(multiply through by (1− µ2))
[
(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1− aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [1− µ2 + aµ]
≥ [(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1 + aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [1− µ2 − aµ]
⇔
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(split out the terms in the first bracket and cancel resulting (additively) matching terms)
[
(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1− aµ) · (−µ2) + (2µ2(1− µ2)) · (+aµ)]
≥ [(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1 + aµ) · (−µ2) + (2µ2(1− µ2)) · (−aµ)]
⇔
(further cancel)
[
(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (−aµ) · (−µ2) + (2µ2(1− µ2)) · (+aµ)]
≥ [(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (+aµ) · (−µ2) + (2µ2(1− µ2)) · (−aµ)]
⇔
(combine terms, flip the minus sign in (−µ2), divide by 2)
(2µ2(1− µ2)) · (+aµ) ≥ (1 + a2 − 2µ2) · (+aµ) · (µ2)
⇔
(divide by aµ3 and re-organize)
(1− µ2) + (1− µ2) ≥ ((1− µ2) + (a2 − µ2)) X true by Case 2b1 assumption that x ≤ 1
Condition 2b2:
[
(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1− aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [ ∞∑
k=2
((aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
]
≥ [(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1 + aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [ ∞∑
k=2
((−aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
]
⇐ ∀ even k ≥ 2
(it is sufficient to show that it holds for each pair of consecutive terms, starting with the first
remaining term for k = 2)
[
(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1− aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [((aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
+
((aµ)/(1− µ2))k+1
(k + 1)!
]
≥ [(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1 + aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [((aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
− ((aµ)/(1− µ
2))k+1
(k + 1)!
]
⇔
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(factor out common terms within the bracket of Taylor Series terms)
[
(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1− aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [((aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
] [
1 +
((aµ)/(1− µ2))
(k + 1)
]
≥ [(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1 + aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [((aµ)/(1− µ2))k
k!
] [
1− ((aµ)/(1− µ
2))
(k + 1)
]
⇔
(multiply through by (1−µ
2)k+1·(k+1)!
(aµ)k
)
[
(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1− aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [(k + 1)(1− µ2) + aµ]
≥ [(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1 + aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [(k + 1)(1− µ2)− aµ]
⇔
(expand within the second brackets)[
(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1− aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [1− µ2 + aµ+ k(1− µ2)]
≥ [(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1 + aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [1− µ2 − aµ+ k(1− µ2)]
⇐
(drop terms corresponding to the exact calculation already shown in Condition 2b1)[
(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1− aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [k(1− µ2)]
≥ [(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1 + aµ) + (2µ2(1− µ2))] [k(1− µ2)]
⇔
(drop the constant factor and then the additive constant)[
(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1− aµ)]
≥ [(2µ2 − a2 − 1) · (1 + aµ)] X by Case 2b assuming (2µ2 − a2 − 1) ≤ 0, aµ < 1
(both sides are negative and the LHS has smaller magnitude)
Lemma A.3. The inequality (2) holds for all µ ∈ [0, 1] and a > 1.
Proof. The main technique is to show that the left hand side in inequality (2) is a monotone
increasing function in a, thus, it is sufficient to check the boundary case where a = 1. And to show
the left hand side is monotone increasing, we will show that its derivative is non-negative, which
we will reuse this technique (it is still increasing, thus only need to check a = 1) again. We will
repeat this technique three times.
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Inequality (2) holds at a = 1. When a = 1, it becomes cases which has been shown in Lemma
A.2.
Inequality (2) is increasing. Take the derivative of the left hand side in (2) respect to a, it
becomes,[
−2a(1− aµ)− µ(2µ2 − a2 − 1) + µ
1− µ2 ((2µ
2 − a2 − 1)(1− aµ) + 2µ2(1− µ2))
]
exp
(
aµ
1− µ2
)
−
[
−2a(1 + aµ) + µ(2µ2 − a2 − 1)− µ
1− µ2 ((2µ
2 − a2 − 1)(1 + aµ) + 2µ2(1− µ2))
]
exp
( −aµ
1− µ2
)
To show monotonicity of the left hand side in (2), it is sufficient to show the derivative is non-
negative, i.e., (after some rearrangement and multiply (1− µ2))
[
a3µ2 + µ3 + a2µ(2− 3µ2)− a(2− 3µ2 + 2µ4)] exp( aµ
1− µ2
)
− [a3µ2 − µ3 − a2µ(2− 3µ2)− a(2− 3µ2 + 2µ4)] exp( −aµ
1− µ2
)
≥ 0
(3)
To show inequality (3) holds for a > 1,we repeat our technique.
Inequality (3) holds at a = 1. When a = 1, the inequality (3) becomes
[
µ2 + µ3 + µ(2− 3µ2)− 2 + 3µ2 − 2µ4] exp( µ
1− µ2
)
− [µ2 − µ3 − µ(2− 3µ2)− 2 + 3µ2 − 2µ4] exp( −µ
1− µ2
)
≥ 0
(4)
After some rearrangement,
[
1− µ− 2µ2 + µ3 + µ4] exp( µ
1− µ2
)
− [1 + µ− 2µ2 − µ3 + µ4] exp( −µ
1− µ2
)
≤ 0
(5)
We consider the first two terms of Taylor Series in (5) and the remaining term separately.
First two terms of Taylor Series in (5) We want to show
[
1− µ− 2µ2 + µ3 + µ4](1 + µ
1− µ2
)
− [1 + µ− 2µ2 − µ3 + µ4](1 + −µ
1− µ2
)
≤ 0
(6)
where the equality holds for all µ.
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The k-th odd terms and (k+1)-th even terms of Taylor Series in (5) We want to show
[
1− µ− 2µ2 + µ3 + µ4]( 1
k!
(
µ
1− µ2
)k
+
1
(k + 1)!
(
µ
1− µ2
)k+1)
− [1 + µ− 2µ2 − µ3 + µ4]( 1
k!
( −µ
1− µ2
)k
+
1
(k + 1)!
( −µ
1− µ2
)k+1)
≤ 0
(7)
Follows the same argument in Condition 2b1b, it is sufficient to show[
1− µ− 2µ2 + µ3 + µ4]− [1 + µ− 2µ2 − µ3 + µ4] ≤ 0 (8)
where the left hand side is −2µ(1− µ2) which is negative for all µ ∈ [0, 1].
Inequality (3) is increasing. Take the derivative of the left hand side in (3) respect to a, it
becomes,
[− 2 + 3µ2 + 3a2µ2 − 2µ4 + 2aµ(2− 3µ2)
+
µ
1− µ2 (a
3µ2 + µ3 + a2µ(2− 3µ2)− a(2− 3µ2 + 2µ4))] exp
(
aµ
1− µ2
)
−[− 2 + 3µ2 + 3a2µ2 − 2µ4 − 2aµ(2− 3µ2)
− µ
1− µ2 (a
3µ2 − µ3 − a2µ(2− 3µ2)− a(2− 3µ2 + 2µ4))] exp
( −aµ
1− µ2
)
(9)
To show monotonicity of the left hand side in (3), it is sufficient to show the derivative is non-
negative, i.e., (after some rearrangement and multiply (1− µ2))[−2 + 5µ2 + a3µ3 − 4µ4 + 2µ6 + a2µ2(5− 6µ2) + aµ(2− 7µ2 + 4µ4)] exp( aµ
1− µ2
)
− [−2 + 5µ2 − a3µ3 − 4µ4 + 2µ6 + a2µ2(5− 6µ2)− aµ(2− 7µ2 + 4µ4)] exp( −aµ
1− µ2
)
≥ 0
(10)
To show inequality (10) holds for a > 1,we repeat our technique one last time.
Inequality (10) holds at a = 1. When a = 1, the inequality (10) becomes[−2 + 5µ2 + µ3 − 4µ4 + 2µ6 + µ2(5− 6µ2) + µ(2− 7µ2 + 4µ4)] exp( µ
1− µ2
)
− [−2 + 5µ2 − µ3 − 4µ4 + 2µ6 + µ2(5− 6µ2)− µ(2− 7µ2 + 4µ4)] exp( −µ
1− µ2
)
≥ 0
(11)
After some rearrangement,[
1− µ− 5µ2 + 3µ3 + 5µ4 − 2µ5 − µ6] exp( µ
1− µ2
)
− [1 + µ− 5µ2 − 3µ3 + 5µ4 + 2µ5 − µ6] exp( −µ
1− µ2
)
≤ 0
(12)
The correctness of inequality (12) is deferred to the end of this analysis.
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Inequality (10) is increasing. Take the derivative of the left hand side in (3) respect to a, it
becomes,
[2µ− 7µ3 + 3a2µ3 + 4µ5 + 2aµ2(5− 6µ2)
+
µ
1− µ2 (−2 + 5µ
2 + a3µ3 − 4µ4 + 2µ6 + a2µ2(5− 6µ2) + aµ(2− 7µ2 + 4µ4))] exp
(
aµ
1− µ2
)
−[− 2µ+ 7µ3 − 3a2µ3 − 4µ5 + 2aµ2(5− 6µ2)
− µ
1− µ2 (−2 + 5µ
2 − a3µ3 − 4µ4 + 2µ6 + a2µ2(5− 6µ2)− aµ(2− 7µ2 + 4µ4))] exp
( −aµ
1− µ2
)
(13)
To show monotonicity of the left hand side in (10), it is sufficient to show the derivative is non-
negative, i.e., (after some rearrangement and multiply 1−µ
2
µ2
· exp(1/(1− µ2))),
[
a3µ2 + a2µ(8− 9µ2)− µ(4− 7µ2 + 2µ4) + a(12− 29µ2 + 16µ4)] exp(1 + aµ
1− µ2
)
− [a3µ2 − a2µ(8− 9µ2) + µ(4− 7µ2 + 2µ4) + a(12− 29µ2 + 16µ4)] exp(1− aµ
1− µ2
)
≥ 0
(14)
We consider the first two terms of Taylor Series and the remaining term separately.
First two terms of Taylor Series in (14) We want to show
[
a3µ2 + a2µ(8− 9µ2)− µ(4− 7µ2 + 2µ4) + a(12− 29µ2 + 16µ4)] [1 + 1 + aµ
1− µ2
]
≥ [a3µ2 − a2µ(8− 9µ2) + µ(4− 7µ2 + 2µ4) + a(12− 29µ2 + 16µ4)] [1 + 1− aµ
1− µ2
] (15)
Multiply both sides by (1− µ2), and move the right hand side to the left hand side,[
a3µ2 + a2µ(8− 9µ2)− µ(4− 7µ2 + 2µ4) + a(12− 29µ2 + 16µ4)] [2− µ2 + aµ]−[
a3µ2 − a2µ(8− 9µ2) + µ(4− 7µ2 + 2µ4) + a(12− 29µ2 + 16µ4)] [2− µ2 − aµ] ≥ 0 (16)
Simplify the left hand side, it becomes,
2µ(−8 + 18µ2 + a4µ2 − 11µ4 + 2µ6 + a2(28− 55µ2 + 25µ4)) ≥ 0 (17)
which is true for all a ≥ 1.
The k-th term of Taylor Series (k ≥ 3) in (14) We want to show
[
a3µ2 + a2µ(8− 9µ2)− µ(4− 7µ2 + 2µ4) + a(12− 29µ2 + 16µ4)] [ 1
k!
(1 + aµ)k
(1− µ2)k
]
≥ [a3µ2 − a2µ(8− 9µ2) + µ(4− 7µ2 + 2µ4) + a(12− 29µ2 + 16µ4)] [ 1
k!
(1− aµ)k
(1− µ2)k
] (18)
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Multiply both sides by k!(1− µ2)k,[
a3µ2 + a2µ(8− 9µ2)− µ(4− 7µ2 + 2µ4) + a(12− 29µ2 + 16µ4)] (1 + aµ) (1 + aµ)k−1
≥ [a3µ2 − a2µ(8− 9µ2) + µ(4− 7µ2 + 2µ4) + a(12− 29µ2 + 16µ4)] (1− aµ) (1− aµ)k−1 (19)
Notice that left hand side is positive, specifically, for all a ≥ 1,[
a3µ2 + a2µ(8− 9µ2)− µ(4− 7µ2 + 2µ4) + a(12− 29µ2 + 16µ4)] (1 + aµ) ≥ 0 (20)
Hence, it is sufficient to show[
a3µ2 + a2µ(8− 9µ2)− µ(4− 7µ2 + 2µ4) + a(12− 29µ2 + 16µ4)] (1 + aµ)
− [a3µ2 − a2µ(8− 9µ2) + µ(4− 7µ2 + 2µ4) + a(12− 29µ2 + 16µ4)] (1− aµ) ≥ 0 (21)
Simplify the left hand side, it becomes,
2µ(−4 + 7µ2 + a4µ2 − 2µ4 + 2a2(10− 19µ2 + 8µ4)) ≥ 0 (22)
which is true for all a ≥ 1.
Deferred Analysis for (12). Start with inequality (12),[
1− µ− 5µ2 + 3µ3 + 5µ4 − 2µ5 − µ6] exp( µ
1− µ2
)
− [1 + µ− 5µ2 − 3µ3 + 5µ4 + 2µ5 − µ6] exp( −µ
1− µ2
)
≤ 0
(23)
To show (12) holds for all µ ∈ [0, 1], we use our technique again.
Inequality (12) holds at µ = 0. When µ = 0, the left hand side becomes zero.
Inequality (12) is decreasing. Take the derivative of the left hand side in (12) respect to µ, it
becomes, [−11 + 7µ+ 31µ2 − 22µ3 − 24a4 + 11µ5 + 6µ6] exp( µ
1− µ2
)
1
1− µ2
− [−11− 7µ+ 31µ2 + 22µ3 − 24µ4 − 11µ5 + 6µ6] exp( −µ
1− µ2
)
1
1− µ2
(24)
To show monotonicity of the left hand side in (12), it is sufficient to show the derivative is non-
positive, i.e., (after some rearrangement and multiply 1−µ
2
µ · exp(0.5/(1− µ2))),[−11 + 7µ+ 31µ2 − 22µ3 − 24a4 + 11µ5 + 6µ6] exp(0.5 + µ
1− µ2
)
− [−11− 7µ+ 31µ2 + 22µ3 − 24µ4 − 11µ5 + 6µ6] exp(0.5− µ
1− µ2
)
≤ 0
(25)
We consider the first two terms of Taylor Series and the remaining term separately.
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First two terms of Taylor Series in (25) We want to show
[−11 + 7µ+ 31µ2 − 22µ3 − 24a4 + 11µ5 + 6µ6] [1 + 0.5 + µ
1− µ2
]
≤ [−11− 7µ+ 31µ2 + 22µ3 − 24µ4 − 11µ5 + 6µ6] [1 + 0.5− µ
1− µ2
] (26)
Multiply both sides by (1− µ2), and move the right hand side to the left hand side,[−11 + 7µ+ 31µ2 − 22µ3 − 24a4 + 11µ5 + 6µ6] [1.5− µ2 + µ]−[−11− 7µ+ 31µ2 + 22µ3 − 24µ4 − 11µ5 + 6µ6] [1.5− µ2 − µ] ≤ 0 (27)
Simplify the left hand side, it becomes,
−µ− 18µ3 + 29µ5 − 10µ7 ≤ 0 (28)
which is true for all µ ∈ [0, 1].
The k-th term of Taylor Series (k ≥ 3) in (25) We want to show
[−11 + 7µ+ 31µ2 − 22µ3 − 24a4 + 11µ5 + 6µ6] [ 1
k!
(0.5 + µ)k
(1− µ2)k
]
≤ [−11− 7µ+ 31µ2 + 22µ3 − 24µ4 − 11µ5 + 6µ6] [ 1
k!
(0.5− µ)k
(1− µ2)k
] (29)
Multiply both sides by k!(1− µ2)k,[−11 + 7µ+ 31µ2 − 22µ3 − 24a4 + 11µ5 + 6µ6] (0.5 + µ) (0.5 + µ)k−1
≤ [−11− 7µ+ 31µ2 + 22µ3 − 24µ4 − 11µ5 + 6µ6] (0.5− µ) (0.5− µ)k−1 (30)
Notice that left hand side is negative, specifically, for all a ≥ 1,[−11 + 7µ+ 31µ2 − 22µ3 − 24a4 + 11µ5 + 6µ6] (0.5 + µ) ≤ 0 (31)
Hence, since (0.5 + µ) ≥ |(0.5− µ)| for µ ∈ [0, 1], it is sufficient to show[−11 + 7µ+ 31µ2 − 22µ3 − 24a4 + 11µ5 + 6µ6] (0.5 + µ)
+
∣∣[−11− 7µ+ 31µ2 + 22µ3 − 24µ4 − 11µ5 + 6µ6] (0.5− µ)∣∣ ≤ 0 (32)
which is true for all µ ∈ [0, 1].
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